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THE TENSION BETWEEN IN RE WINSHIP AND THE
USE OF PRESUMPTIONS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
AFTER SANDSTROM, ALLEN and CLARK
LISA MANN BURKE*

INTRODUCTION

In In re Winship, the United States Supreme Court declared that "the
due-process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."' The Court's holding necessarily called
into question the criminal justice system's long-standing reliance on presumptions, 2 because presumptions had the effect of easing the burden on
the prosecution to prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 Insofar as most. courts employed jury instructions encompassing
such presumptions, the continuing validity of these instructions was also
in doubt after Winship. In the past seven years, the United States Supreme
Court has addressed the constitutionality of jury instructions on presumptions in criminal cases on five separate occasions. 4 Despite this
guidance, a large body of frequently contradictory precedent has developed in the lower courts. This paper will discuss the tension between the
principle of In re Winship and presumptions in criminal cases by examining the law recently emanating from the United States Supreme Court
and lower court interpretations of that law.
*J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1985; Law Clerk to Senior Judge Howard C.
Bratton, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
1. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that permitted
adjudication of juvenile delinquency on a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 364.
2. Presumptions have been described as "evidentiary devices that assist the trier [of fact] in
determining the existence of an ultimate or elemental fact from the existence of a basic fact." Note,
After Sandstron: The Constitutionality of Presumptions that Shift
the Burden of Production, 1981
Wis. L. REV. 519, 519. This description applies with equal force to statutorily-created and common
law presumptions.
For purposes of this paper, the term "presumptions" will be understood as including conclusive
or irrebuttable presumptions, presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion, presumptions that
shift the burden of production, and permissive inferences. These four evidentiary devices will be
discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra.
3. "In criminal cases, . . .a presumption may be sufficient to take an otherwise defective case
to the jury and ultimately result in a conviction that otherwise could not have occurred." C. MCCORUCK,
EVIDENCE 811 (2d ed. 1972).
4. See Rose v. Clark, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986), Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985),
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and
County Court, Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
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I. THE GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. The Theoretical Problem Arising From the Tension Between the
Winship Principle and Presumptions in Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court established in Winship that the burden is placed
squarely upon the prosecution to prove every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.' Presumptions, however, which have been
described as "a staple of our adversary system of fact-finding," 6 operate
to allow the trier of fact (the jury) to determine the existence of an element
from the existence of one or more
of a crime (the "ultimate fact")
"evidentiary" or "basic" facts. 7 Although it might not appear that this
process would be inherently threatening to the Winship requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of a crime, "presumptions
in criminal cases typically arise in response to the prosecution's difficulty
in proving an element of the crime, most often the mental element. "' By
allowing the prosecution to "prove" a critical element of a crime, such
as intent, by reliance on an evidentiary device that allows the jury to
presume the presence of that element from proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of a less difficult-to-prove element, the Winship requirement may,
indeed, be undermined.9
Furthermore, the very act of instructing a jury about the presumption
adds weight to the prosecution's case.'o The facts from which the jury is
told they may presume the "ultimate fact" may become endowed with
greater substance than they would otherwise possess.11 Finally, the process
may promote irrational decision-making by the jury. Instructing the jury
that they may find the existence of the "ultimate fact" from the presence
of facts already in evidence merely informs the jury of a permissible
outcome. Such instructions provide no guidance as to why a jury should
reach such an outcome. Indeed, even when requested to clarify the pres5. 397 U.S. at 364.
6. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156.
7. Id.
8. Note, The Evolving Use of Presumptions in the Criminal Law: Sandstrom v. Montana, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1146 (1980).
9. The presumption eases the prosecution's burden by allowing the mental element to be inferred
from the act. Although the jury naturally might make the inference from the evidence, the presumption
assures the factfinder that a conviction can be secured even if there is no direct evidence on an
element. Id.at 1146-47.
10. "Through the use of presumptions, certain inferences are commended to the attention of
jurors by legislatures or courts." Allen, 442 U.S. at 169 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Allen,
Structuring Jury Decisionmaking inCriminal Cases: A Unified ConstitutionalApproachto Evidentiary
Devices, 94 HARV. L. REv. 321, 322 (1980).
11. Cf. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (a presumption gives facts "artificial
value").
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umptive instructions, most judges simply feel obliged to restate the original, often confusing instructions.' 2
The judiciary has repeatedly confronted the tension between the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the use of
presumptions in criminal cases. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court
addressed this problem directly in Sandstrom v. Montana. 3 This paper
shall demonstrate that despite the Court's apparent resolution of the problem in Sandstrom and County Court, Ulster County v. Allen,' 4 its recent
approach to the issue leaves the vitality of the Winship principle very
much in doubt.
B. The Supreme Court Background
In Sandstrom v. Montana,'5 David Sandstrom was convicted of "deliberate homicide" under a Montana statute. ' 6 Although Sandstrom had
confessed to killing the victim, Annie Jessen, he denied having the requisite intent.' 7 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts," despite defense counsel's objection that the instruction had the
effect of impermissibly shifting the prosecution's burden of proof on the
issue of purpose or knowledge to the defendant. 8 On appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the instruction and rejected
the defendant's argument, finding that "[d]efendant's sole burden ...
was to produce some evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, not to disprove that he acted 'purposely'
or 'knowingly."" ' 9 The Montana Supreme Court thus characterized the
12. See, e.g., Rock v. Coombe, 694 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.1083
(1983) (presumption language twice repeated in supplemental instructions responding to the jury's
requests for clarification on the issue of intent). One commentator has suggested that this dilemma
could be avoided by replacing presumptive jury instructions with judicial comment. See Allen, supra
note 10, at 365.
13. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The Court stated that "the question before this Court is whether the
challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in
Winship on the critical question of petitioner's state of mind." Id. at 521.
14. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).

15. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
16. MONT.CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1978). The statute provided that criminal homicide constituted
deliberate homicide if "it is committed purposely or knowingly." Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512.
17. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512.
18. Id. at 513. The presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
voluntary acts is a common law presumption "of ancient vintage." Note, supra note 2, at 525 n.
27. The presumption has been classified as "derived from the course of nature," "founded on the
'feelings and emotions natural to the human heart."' Id. (quoting W. BEST, A TREATISE ON PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND FACr 170, 175, 176 (1844)).
19. 176 Mont. 492, 497, 580 P.2d 106, 109 (1978) (emphasis added).
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presumption as one that .shifted only the burden of production onto the
defendant.20
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 2 Although the Court recognized that the Montana Supreme Court was the final authority on the
legal weight to be given a presumption under Montana law, it stressed
that the lower court did not have such authority in determining the jury's
potential interpretation of the instruction.22 Despite the fact that some
jurors might have interpreted the instruction as permissive or as shifting
only the burden of production, the Supreme Court held that the possibility
of interpreting the presumption as "conclusive" or as "shifting the burden
of persuasion" on the element of intent was sufficient to call into question
the instruction's constitutional validity.2 3
[Tihe fact that a reasonable juror could have given the presumption
conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect means that we cannot discount the possibility that Sandstrom's jurors actually did proceed
upon one or the other of these latter interpretations. And that means
that unless these kinds of presumptions are constitutional, the instruction cannot be adjudged valid. 24
The Court first determined that intent (whether manifested through
purpose or knowledge) was an element of the crime of deliberate homicide, as defined in the Montana statute.25 Since the presumption would
have the effect of relieving the prosecution of its burden of proof on
intent, the Court concluded that the instruction was constitutionally infirm,
as mandated by Winship.26 Thus, the Court reaffirmed Winship as a con20. The burden of production denotes the obligation to raise an issue. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proofin the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1329 n. 8 (1979).
The party bearing the burden of production must adduce some evidence of a particular factual
assertion to introduce that issue into the case. If a rational factfinder is satisfied that enough evidence
has been adduced to make it likely that the issue will be proved, the burden of production is satisfied.
McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1382, 1390-91 (1955).
The burden of persuasion denotes the obligation to prove to the factfinder the ultimate truth of
the particular factual assertion. If, after all the evidence is considered, the trier of fact remains
unconvinced, the burden of persuasion has not been satisfied. Jeffries & Stephan, supra.
21. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 527.
22. Id. at 516-17. The Court therefore did not reach the question of the constitutionality of a
production-shifting presumption like the one described by the Montana Supreme Court.
23. A conclusive presumption requires the jury to find the existence of an ultimate fact (an element
of the offense, such as intent) from the existence of the basic fact (such as the defendant's voluntary
act, in Sandstrom).
24. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519. "The pivotal concept of Sandstrom is that the possibility that
the jury reached its decision in an impermissible manner requires reversal even though the jury may
also have reached the same result in a constitutionally acceptable fashion." Schmolesky, County
Court of Ulster County v. Allen and Sandstrom v. Montana: The Supreme Court Lends an Ear but
Turns Its Face. 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 261, 272 (1981) (emphasis in original).
25. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 520. In fact, it was the only element of the crime in dispute. Id. at
521.
26. Id. The instruction was invalid whether it was construed as containing a conclusive or burdenshifting presumption. Id.
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stitutional limitation on the use of presumptions to relieve the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal cases.
Just two weeks before it decided Sandstrom, however, the Court decided a case that would appear to cast doubt on the breadth of the Sand27
strom holding. In County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that provided
that the presence of a firearm in an automobile was presumptive evidence
of the firearm's illegal possession by all people then occupying the automobile.2 8 Two large-caliber handguns were in an open handbag, visible
through the window of the car. The handbag belonged to a 16-year-old
girl, Jane Doe, who, although one of the original defendants, was not
one of the three respondents in Allen. At trial, the defendants objected
to the prosecution's introduction of the objects seized from the car (including the handguns) as evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection on the basis of the statutory presumption.29 At the end of the trial,
the judge instructed the jurors:
Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of
any machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is
presumptive evidence of their unlawful possession.
In other words, these presumptions or this latter presumption upon
proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons,
you may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon
was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only so long as there is no
substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from the
presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when such
contradictory evidence is adduced.
The presumption or presumptions which I discussed with the jury
relative to the drugs or weapons in this case need not be rebutted by
affirmative proof or affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by any
evidence or lack of evidence in the case.3°
The defendants did not object to this instruction. 3
The three adult co-defendants were convicted, and their convictions
27. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). The Court decided Allen on June 4, 1979. The Sandstrom case was
decided on June 18, 1979.
28. Id. at 165. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967). The statute exempted stolen or
public vehicles from the presumption, and provided that the presumption would not apply when the
firearm was found on the person of one of the occupants of the vehicle.
29. Allen, 442 U.S. at 144-45.
30. Id. at 161, n. 20.
31. Id. at 145. The failure to object to a jury instruction containing a statutory or common law
presumption seldom precludes appellate review of the instruction's constitutionality. See, e.g., Brooks
v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 3340 (1986); State v.
LaForge, 347 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 1984); State v. Martell, 465 A.2d 1346 (Vt. 1983); Engle v.
Koehler, 707 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 1673 (1984) per curiam (by an equally
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were affirmed by the New York Appellate Division and the New York
Court of Appeals.3" The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, however, granted the defendants' petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory presumption was facially unconstitutional because it "sweeps within its compass (1) many occupants
who may not know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their
sight), and (2) many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but
[are] not permitted access to it.""
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 34 After reviewing the distinctions between "permissive" and "mandatory" presumptions, the Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' analysis and characterization
of the New York statutory presumption as mandatory.35 Praising the trial
judge's "careful" instructions, the Court found that they encompassed
merely a "permissive inference available only in certain circumstances,
rather than a mandatory conclusion of possession, and that it could be
ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof offered by the
defendants in rebuttal." 36 Once the Court found the presumption to be
"permissive," the only possible impediment to its constitutionality was
the due process question of whether there was a rational relationship
between the basic fact (presence of firearms in the automobile) and the
ultimate fact (unlawful possession).37 The Court found that "[a]s applied

to the facts of this case, the presumption of possession is entirely rational." 38 It was, therefore, constitutional.
divided Court); Plass v. State, 457 A.2d 362 (Del. Sup. 1983); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d
1126 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1982); State
v. Roth, 637 P.2d 1013 (Wash. App. 1981); State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1981); McGuinn
v. Crist, 657 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
32. People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (1976).
33. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998, 1007 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S.
140 (1979).
34. Allen, 442 U.S. at 167.
35. Id. at 156-60. A mandatory, or rebuttable presumption, requires the jury to find the existence
of an ultimate fact, such as intent, unless the defendant produces sufficient evidence to show that
he lacked intent. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 20, at 1335. Mandatory presumptions shift either
the burden of persuasion or production onto the defendant, depending on the quantum of evidence
required of the defendant. Id. at 1335, n. 20.
A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the jury to find the existence of an ultimate
fact from proof of the basic fact, and "places no burden of any kind on the defendant." Allen, 442
U.S. at 157.
36. Allen, 442 U.S. at 161.
37. The Court had already stated that an inference "affects the application of the 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference."
Id. at 157 (emphasis added). Therefore, once the Court found the basic fact rationally related to
the presumptive fact in this case, its due process analysis was complete.
38. Id. at 163.
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Although it is arguable that the Allen and Sandstrom opinions are
reconcilable, 39 their impact on subsequent lower court decisions has resulted in confusion. This confusion may result from the two opinions'
emphasis on different constitutional safeguards in reaching their respective
results. In Sandstrom, as in Winship, the Supreme Court focused on the
criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to have a jury find that the
prosecution had proved every element of the crime. In Allen, on the other
hand, the Court focused on the due process right to an accurate factfinding process. At least one point, however, emerges clearly from the
two opinions: the initial process of classification of the presumption is
likely to be determinative of the result of a constitutional challenge.
II. THE STATUS OF PRESUMPTIONS AFTER ALLEN AND SANDSTROM

A. Conclusive Presumptions
In Sandstrom, the Supreme Court was concerned that the jury might
have interpreted the instruction "the law presumes that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" as a conclusive presumption. The Court described a conclusive presumption as "an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts
triggering the presumption. "4 The Court has recognized that such a
presumption was not technically a presumption at all, but rather a rule
of substantive law.41
The Sandstrom Court's aversion to conclusive presumptions should
have come as no surprise. The Supreme Court had invalidated such
instructions twice before, in Morissette v. United States4 and in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. 43 In Morissette, the defendant was
39. As one commentator noted:
The ultimate holdings of Allen and Sandstrom do not clash.The primary concern
of the unanimous Sandstrom Court was with the instruction's propensity to mislead
the jury into regarding the presumption as conclusive or as shifting the burden
of persuasion. Had the Sandstrom Court been satisfied that the instruction to the
jury could only be interpreted as permissive, as the Court was satisfied in Allen,
there is no indication that any constitutional defect would have remained.
Schmolesky, supra note 24, at 273.
The Allen Court's assumption that permissive presumptions or inferences are constitutional as
long as the basic facts presented are rationally related to the ultimate facts presumed will be examined
in Part II, infra.
40. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at517.
41. Id.See Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1973 n.5 (1985) ("An irrebuttable presumption,
of course, does not shift any burden to the defendant; it eliminates an element from the case if the
State proves the requisite predicate facts.") (emphasis in original). See also Graham, PresumptionsMore Than You Ever Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested to Ask, Evidence and Trial
Advocacy Workshop, CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 431,435. Despite the admitted inaccuracy of referring

to these substantive rules of law as "presumptions", this paper will adhere to common practice in
labeling them "conclusive presumptions."
42. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
43. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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charged with theft of government property after taking abandoned bomb
casings from a bombing range." The defendant denied any intent to steal,
but the trial court instructed the jury to presume intent and refused to
allow the defendant to rebut the presumption.45 The Supreme Court established that intent was an element of the crime and then stated:
It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue
by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an
act ....

A conclusive presumption which testimony could not over-

throw would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. .

.

. [T]his presumption would conflict with the overriding

presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused
and which extends to every element of the crime.'
In United States v. Gypsum Co., the Court reaffirmed its holding in
Morissette. Defendants charged with criminal violations of the Sherman
Act challenged a jury instruction remarkably similar to that invalidated
in Sandstrom. The instruction contained the following language:
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural
consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges
of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain and stabilize prices,
then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter of law, to have
intended that result.47
Because intent was an element of a criminal antitrust offense, the Court
found that it could not be removed from the trier of fact's consideration
"through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent ... .
Although not explicitly stated in any of its three decisions concerning
conclusive presumptions, the Court's language came suspiciously close
to invalidating those presumptions as the equivalent of "directed verdicts"
for the prosecution. As the Sandstrom Court described it, " [ulpon finding
proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of facts insufficient
to establish the second (the voluntariness and 'ordinary consequences' of
defendant's action), Sandstrom'sjurors could reasonably have concluded
that they were directed to find against defendant on the element of intent." 49 Although a directed verdict in favor of the defense is possible in
44. 342 U.S. at 247-48.
45. Id. at 249.
46. Id. at 274-75.
47. 438 U.S. at 430.
48. Id. at 435. The Court concluded that "ultimately the decision on the issue of intent must be
left to the trier of fact alone. The instruction given invaded this fact-finding function." Id. at 446.
Conclusive presumptions on an element of a crime effectively remove that element from the
definition of that crime. See Allen, supra note 10, at 356. Although the Sandstrom Court reached
the same result (invalidation of the conclusive presumption), it did not directly address this concern.
49. 442 U.S. at 523. See also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983).
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criminal cases, a directed verdict in favor of the State is not possible, as
it would impair both the right to trial by jury and the right to have the
State prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.5"
Many of the lower courts that have reviewed instructions identical to
the one given in Sandstrom have found constitutional error on precisely
this basis. In State v. Walton, 5 the defendant was convicted of two counts
of theft by deception. As in Sandstrom, the jury had been instructed that
"[t]he law presumes that a person intends the reasonable and ordinary
consequences of his own acts." 52 The Utah Supreme Court found reversible error in the giving of the instruction, stating "[i]f the jury interpreted the presumption as conclusive, the State's burden of proof was
automatically met irrespective of other evidence on the question of intent. ""
Similarly, in Garland v. Maggio,54 defendant appealed his conviction
for second-degree murder. At trial, the jury had been instructed that "I[t]he
law holds that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his own deliberate acts."" The court recognized the
similarity between the instruction given at Garland's trial and that invalidated in Sandstrom, and found the instruction constitutionally unsound. "A plea of 'not guilty' places all elements of the charged crime
into issue, forcing the state to establish every element beyond a reasonable
doubt. Under most circumstances, a Sandstrom instruction effectively
relieves the state of its constitutional burden of proving the element of
requisite intent." 56 This conclusion, however, was not dispositive of the
result in the case. The court of appeals did not issue a writ of habeas
corpus, despite its finding of constitutional error, because it determined
the error to be harmless.57
After Sandstrom, the many courts examining instructions similar or
identical to the instruction given in that case have had little difficulty in
discerning the instructions' infirmities.58 Even instructions on presump50. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); Carpenters v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947). See also Note, Presumptive Intent Jury InstructionsAfter
Sandstrom, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 366, 374.
51. 646 P.2d 689 (Utah, 1982).
52. Id.at 691.
53. Id.at 692.
54. 717 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 203.
56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 204. The harmlessness of Sandstrom-type constitutional errors will be discussed in Part
III, infra.
58. See, e.g., State v. Martell, 465 A.2d 1346, 1347 (Vt. 1983) ("Under the law a person is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts."); People v. Mitchell, 58
N.Y.2d 368, -_,461 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271, 448 N.E.2d 121, -. (1983) ("person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his act and, accordingly, if the consequences are
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tions quite different from the instruction in Sandstrom have been subjected
59
to the Sandstrom conclusive or burden-shifting presumption analysis.
Such analysis is not, however, necessarily dispositive of the result in
those cases. In Rose v. Clark, the United States Supreme Court determined
that instructions that were unconstitutional under Sandstrom were amenable to harmless error analysis.' The effect of harmless error analysis
on the vitality of the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt on all elements of the charged crime will be discussed in Part III,
infra.
B. Presumptionsthat Shift the Burden of Persuasion
The Supreme Court invalidated the Sandstrom presumption because it
could have been interpreted either as a conclusive presumption or as a
6
presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion onto the defendant.
natural and probable, he will not be heard to say that he did not intend them."); Plass v. State, 457
A.2d 362, 367 (Del. Supr. 1983) ("A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act."); People v. Woods, 416 Mich. 581, -_,331 N.W.2d 707, 709 (1982), cert.
denied by Michigan v. Alexander, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 652 n.
3 (N.D. 1982) ("It is presumed ... however, that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.");
Turcio v. Manson, 186 Conn. 1, -, 439 A.2d 437, 440 (1982) ("Every person is conclusively
presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his acts."); State v. Amado, 433 A.2d
233 (R.I. 1981); State v. Roth, 30 Wash.App. 740, 637 P.2d 1013 (Ct. App. 1981); Collins v.
Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 361 (1984) ("A
person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts."); United States v. Crowder, 719 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2352
(1984); Healy v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 428 (1983) ("The
law holds that a sane person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his
own deliberate act."); Ramirez v. Jones, 683 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016
(1983); Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461, 462 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983)
("a man is presumed to intend that which he does, or which is the immediate or necessary consequences of his act.").
59. See, e.g., People v. Frazier, 79 Ill.Dec. 27, -. , 123 Ill.App.3d 563, -. , 463 N.E.2d 165,
171 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1984) ("If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of alcohol in
the defendant's blood as shown by a chemical analysis of his breath was .10 percent or more by
weight of alcohol, you shall presume that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. "); Trenor
v. State, 252 Ga. 264, -, 313 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1984) ("If you find that a homicide is proved to
have been committed in this case by the defendant, and with a weapon that you find was, in the
manner in which it was used upon the occasion in question, a weapon likely to produce death, the
law would presume malice and the intent to kill."); Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Wyo.
1983) ("the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly or dangerous manner raises a presumption of
malice."); State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Minn. 1982) ("It is enough to prove such
intention if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time defendant issued the check the
checking account did not have sufficient funds to pay the check."); Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562,
1577 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("[w]hen the state's evidence shows the commission of a homicide by the
accused by the use of a deadly weapon, the law presumes murder.").
60. Clark, 106 S.Ct. at 3109.
61. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524. See note 20, supra, for a discussion of burdens of persuasion
and production. See also text accompanying note 84, infra. See note 23, supra, for a definition of
conclusive presumptions.
In Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1968 (1985), Justices Brennan and Rehnquist disagreed as to
whether the Court's analysis in Sandstrom constituted alternative holdings (Brennan, J., 105 S.Ct.
at 1973, n. 5), or whether the language concerning mandatory rebuttable presumptions was merely
dictum (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, 105 S.Ct. at 1981).
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A presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion, or mandatory rebuttable presumption, "does not remove the presumed element from the
case if the State proves the predicate facts, but it nonetheless relieves the
State of the affirmative burden of persuasion on the presumed element
by instructing the jury that it must find the presumed element unless the
defendant persuades the jury not to make such a finding. "62 In Sandstrom,
the Court described the possible effect of a shift in the burden of persuasion: the jury "could have concluded that upon proof by the State of
the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element
of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that he lacked
the requisite mental state." 63 As the Sandstrom Court pointed out, such
a presumption was found to be unconstitutional in Mullaney v. Wilbur.6'
In Mullaney, the defendant was charged and convicted of murder, which
was defined under state law as requiring proof of both intent and malice.
The jury was instructed that if the prosecution proved intent, malice would
be presumed unless it was rebutted by the defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion.65 The
United States Supreme Court held that the presumption of malice violated
Winship's due process requirement by relieving the prosecution of its
burden of proof on an essential element of the crime.66 The presumption
invalidated in Mullaney is a classic example of a presumption that unconstitutionally shifts the burden of persuasion onto the defendant.67
One year ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prohibition against
presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion ("mandatory rebuttable
presumptions") in Francis v. Franklin.68 In Franklin, a state prisoner,
while attempting to escape, shot and killed a local resident when the
prisoner's gun went off, penetrating the front door of the resident's house
62. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1972-73.
63. 442 U.S. at 524. The party who has the burden of persuasion in criminal cases must prove
that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 793 (2d ed. 1972).
64. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
65. Id. at 686. Murder committed under heat of passion carried a statutorily reduced penalty.
66. See id. at 703-04.
67. The Court's broad prohibition against burden-shifting presumptions may have been severely
undercut by its subsequent holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). In Patterson,
the defendant was charged with second degree murder under a statute that required the defendant
to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the affirmative defense of "extreme
emotional disturbance." Id. at 198. Despite the fact that the affirmative defense operated in an almost
identical manner to the defense of "heat of passion" invalidated in Mullaney, the PattersonCourt
upheld New York's allocation of the burden of persuasion to the defendant on this issue. Id. at 216.
The Court distinguished Mullaney on the basis that in Patterson the prosecution had proven every
fact necessary to constitute a crime as defined by the state. Id. at 205-06.
The clear lesson of Patterson and Mullaney is that legislators have been warned to be precise in
their draftsmanship of statutes defining crimes: "The reasonable doubt rule, after Patterson v. New
York, applies only to those issues that the state legislatures have chosen to include in the portion of
the statutory text defining the offense charged." Comment, Affirmative Criminal Defenses-The
Reasonable Doubt Rule in the Aftermath of Pattersonv. New York, 39 OHIO ST.L.J. 393, 413 (1978).
68. 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985).
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as he slammed the door against the intruding prisoner. Franklin denied
that he intended to kill the resident and claimed that the death was an
accident. At trial, the jury was instructed that a person's acts are presumed
to be the product of that person's will, but that the presumption could
be rebutted.69 Franklin was found guilty of murder.7"
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals' order issuing a writ of habeas corpus, reasoning that "the
instruction that the presumptions 'may be rebutted' could reasonably be
read as telling the jury that it was required to infer intent to kill as the
natural and probable consequence of the act of firing the gun unless the
defendant persuaded the jury that such an inference was unwarranted." 7
Such a burden-shifting presumption was unconstitutional. 72 As in Sandstrom, the fact that the instruction might reasonably have been understood
as creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption was dispositive.73
Since the Sandstrom decision, lower courts have generally not had
great difficulty in ascertaining when challenged jury instructions contained
impermissible burden-shifting presumptions. Many of these instructions
have contained explicit burden-shifting language, like that held invalid
in State v. Mincey.74 In Mincey, the Arizona trial court gave an instruction
identical to that invalidated in Sandstrom and continued with the following
language: "Any such presumption as I have mentioned, however, maybe
[sic] overcome by contrary evidence."" The Mincey court explained its
reason for invalidating the above instructions: "The net effect of the series
of instructions is that it falls on appellant to disprove, rather than on the
state to prove, the element of intent, an element required for both firstand second-degree murder. '"76
The instructions found constitutionally defective in Mincey explicitly
stated that the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant was the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.7 7 In other cases, however,
appellate courts have been troubled by the lack of specificity in the jury
instructions as to precisely how great the burden placed upon the defendant
69. The specific language of the instruction was:
The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product
of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person of sound
mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts, but the presumption may be rebutted.
Id. at 1969-70.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 1973.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 1977.
74. 130 Ariz. 389, 636 P.2d 637 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982).
75. Id. at -_, 636 P.2d at 644.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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actually was.78 In these cases, the distinction between the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production becomes less clear." In State v.
Williams,8" the Idaho Court of Appeals held invalid jury instructions given
in the defendant's trial for second degree burglary. The jury had been
instructed that unexplained breaking and entering raised a "presumption
• . . that the breaking and entering were accomplished with the intent to
commit larceny," but then were told that the presumption was effective
"only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from the presumption." 8 The court rejected the state's
assertion that the instructions merely shifted the burden of production,
finding that the instructions did not explain how the presumption might
be rebutted and that the jurors might have expected the accused to overcome each presumption absolutely.82
A similar state argument was made and rejected in Harris v. Israel.83
In that case, the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder. At
trial, the jury had been given the following Wisconsin jury instruction:
"When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption,
the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all of the natural,
probable, and usual consequences of his deliberate acts." 84 Despite a
Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretation of the same instruction that focused on the "no circumstances" language to conclude that the instruction
was constitutional, 85 the Harriscourt concluded that the instruction could
have been interpreted as shifting the burden of persuasion onto the defendant, and was therefore invalid.86 The court rejected the notion that
the jury could have interpreted the instruction as requiring the defendant
to submit only "some" evidence, with the burden of proof remaining at
all times on the prosecution:
78. See, e.g., Dix v. Kemp, 804 F.2d 618, 620 (1lth Cir. 1987) ("There is no mention of the
quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption. Because of this omission, the jury could
have concluded that Dix had to produce more than 'some' evidence to rebut the presumption.").
79. This distinction becomes particularly telling when it is remembered that in Allen, the Supreme
Court suggested that "[t]o the extent that a presumption imposes an extremely low burden of
production-e.g., being satisfied by 'any' evidence-it may well be that its impact is no greater
than that of a permissive inference, and it may be proper to analyze it as such." Allen, 442 U.S.
at 157, n. 16. As will be discussed in detail in Part D, infra, the analysis of permissive inferences
suggested by the Court in Allen requires considerably less scrutiny than that required of even
presumptions that shift the burden of production onto the defendant. As has already been discussed,
presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion are constitutionally invalid under Sandstrom. See
note 20, supra, for a discussion of burdens of persuasion and production.
80. 103 Idaho 635, 651 P.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1982).
81. Id. at __, 651 P.2d at 572.
82. Id. at 574.
83. 515 F.Supp. 568 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
84. Id. at 570.
85. Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis.2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980). This case is discussed extensively in Note, supra note 2, at 528-34.
86. 515 F.Supp. at 571.
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This is indeed a subtle notion. While one schooled in the fine distinctions of the law may appreciate the idea of a presumption which
is countered by the production of evidence that does not persuade
one to the contrary, the idea is foreign to the layman. The usual and
customary meaning of the term 'rebut' is 'to contradict. . . by countervailing proof.' A proposition is generally not thought to have been
rebutted until it has been shown that it is more likely than not that
the contrary is true. 7

Many of the lower courts examining jury instructions dealing with
presumptions have focused on the particular language of those instructions
in determining whether they improperly shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant.8 8 At least a few courts, however, have recognized that an
overly formalistic reliance on the presence or absence of specific terms
in the instructions may undermine the Sandstrom holding.89 The standard
analysis used by most lower courts after Sandstrom appears to be, first,
to determine whether the jury instruction included a presumption concerning one of the statutorily-defined elements of the crime and, second,
whether that instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant." ° Even after determining that the answers to both
of the above questions are affirmative, however, reversal of the judgment
is not assured. Despite finding that the presumption shifted the burden
of persuasion onto the defendant, in violation of Sandstrom, the violation
may be found to be harmless error. This issue will be discussed in Part
III, infra.
C. Presumptions that Shift the Burden of Production

A presumption that shifts the burden of production does not, in theory,
alter the burden of persuasion (which remains on the prosecution in
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. See, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1388 (1lth Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert denied,
106 S.Ct. 3340 (1986); State v. LaForge, 347 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. 1984); Goswick v. State,
656 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Tex.Ct.App. 1983); Conway v. Anderson, 698 F.2d 282, 284 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983); Rock v. Coombe, 694 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983). Such analysis is, arguably, required by the Supreme Court: "Analysis
must focus initially on the specific language challenged .. " Franklin, 105 S.Ct. at 1971.
89. See, e.g., State v. Rainey, 298 Or. 459, -, 693 P.2d 635, 639 (1985) ("it is not the label
given to the evidentiary device, but the effect upon the burden of proof that is significant. The
evidentiary device is not permitted to relieve the state of the burden of proving all elements of a
crime."); Patterson v. Austin, 728 F.2d 1389, 1395 (1 IthCir. 1984) ("Sandstrom-type issues cannot
be decided by the application of a rigid and pre-determined list of criteria, in which the presence
or absence of a particular phrase must inevitably be dispositive of whether a given instruction is to
be sanctioned or condemned."); Engle v. Koehler, 707 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1983), affid per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 104 S.Ct. 1673 (1984) ("The question is one of burden-shifting
effect, not of verbal formulation.").
90. See, e.g., Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131 (8th Cir. 1981).
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criminal cases), but requires the jury to draw a certain inference unless
the defendant produces some evidence to the contrary. 9 The United States
Supreme Court in Sandstrom did not address the constitutionality of
presumptions that shift the burden of production onto the defendant,
because it rejected the State's characterization of the presumption at issue
as one of that sort.92 Similarly, in Allen, the Court rejected the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' characterization, instead finding the instruction
at issue to contain merely a permissive inference.9 3 The Allen Court did
suggest that presumptions that shift the burden of production might be
constitutional," but was not forced to decide the question.
Despite the Allen Court's assumption to the contrary, however, there
still remain serious questions about the constitutionality of presumptions
that shift the burden of production onto the defendant in a criminal case.
First, although it is conceded that the defendant thereby receives the
burden of going forward with some evidence, it is by no means clear
how much evidence is, in fact, required. The Allen Court suggested that
when the burden of production was extremely low (that is, satisfied by
"any evidence"), it would be appropriate to analyze it as a permissive
inference. 95 Conversely, when the burden of production is high (for example, "substantial evidence"), it is practically identical to a presumption
that shifts the burden of persuasion."
Indeed, regardless of the extent of the burden, presumptions that shift
the burden of production may share many of the same constitutional
infirmities that invalidate presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion
onto the criminal defendant. Presumptions that shift the burden of production share the same "implied directed verdict" problem already dis91. State v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145, 151 (1983). For a discussion of the burden
of persuasion, see note 20, supra.
92. 442 U.S. at 515. Similarly, in Franklin, the Court explicitly refrained from deciding whether
a presumption that shifts only the burden of production to the defendant is constitutional. 105 S.Ct.
at 1971 n. 3.
93. Allen, 442 U.S. at 160. In Allen, however, unlike Sandstrom, the Court discussed at length
the difference between analyzing production-shifting presumptions and permissive inferences. See
id. at 157-60.
94. Id. at 157 n. 16.
95. Id. The Court appeared to be suggesting that in such situations, the presumption is, in practical
effect, indistinguishable from a permissive inference. Id. See note 35, supra, and accompanying
text for a discussion of permissive inferences. See also text accompanying note 11l, infra.
96. One commentator has noted that the primary distinction between burdens of production and
persuasion is "merely quantitative." Note, supra note 10, at 328. Despite the fact that the level of
persuasion used to test the satisfaction of a burden of production may be considerably lower than
that used to test the satisfaction of a burden of persuasion, the court is still asked to determine
whether the evidence presented has any persuasive force at all. On the other hand, it is likely that
in most cases, "the burden of production will require the defendant to raise no more than a reasonable
doubt with respect to an issue; this represents a burden of persuasion no greater than that normally
required of the defendant even when the burden of production remains with the state." Id. at 329.
In such cases, then, the theoretical utility of such an instruction is doubtful at best.
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cussed with respect to presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion.97
Furthermore, when it is the judge, rather than the jury, who decides when
the burden of production has been met, the judge may not instruct the
jury on that issue at all if he decides that the burden of production on an
issue has not been satisfied.98 Conversely, if the defendant has satisfied
his burden of production, it is difficult to see why the jury should receive
any instruction on the presumption at all; once the evidence99is produced
and the burden satisfied, the presumption should disappear.
The problem with a production-shifting presumption is brought most
clearly into focus when it is realized that, as a practical matter, it forces
the defendant to take the witness stand in order to satisfy his burden.
When, as is frequently the case, no testimonial or circumstantial evidence
other than the defendant's own testimony is available, the criminal defendant will be confronted with a true Hobson's choice: to risk what will
amount to a directed verdict against him on the disputed element, or to
take the witness stand, thus abandoning his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These problems have not escaped the attention of lower courts analyzing presumptions that shift the burden of production. In State v. Johnson, 10' the defendant challenged his conviction of four felony counts of
passing worthless checks on the basis of improper jury instructions. 102
The Kansas Supreme Court was troubled by the imprecise nature of the
presumption. It explained that "the jury must be clearly instructed as to
the nature and extent of the presumption and that it does not shift the
97. See note 49, supra, and accompanying text. "Instructing a jury that under certain circumstances it must draw a particular inference infringes upon both the right to trial by jury on that
element and the right to have the State prove every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such an instruction is in reality just a polite form of a partial directed verdict, a procedural device
which is 'abhorrent to the criminal law."' State v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 607, __, 674 P.2d 145,
152 (1983) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 804 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in original)).
98. Allen, supra note 10, at 329. The risk of foreclosing jury consideration of an issue thus
determined adversely to a criminal defendant may conflict with the defendant's right to trial by jury
under the sixth amendment. See State v. Johnson, 100 Wash. 2d 607, -,674 P.2d 145, 152 (1983).
99. In that respect, the presumption that shifts the burden of production should operate like a
Thayer "bursting bubble" presumption. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 821 (2d ed. 1972).
100. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
101. 233 Kan. 981, 666 P.2d 706 (1983).
102. The instruction atissue read:
In any prosecution against the maker or drawer of a check, . . .payment of
which has been refused by the drawee on account of insufficient funds, the
making, drawing, issuing or delivering of such check shall be prima facie
evidence of intent to defraud and of knowledge of insufficient funds in, or on
deposit with, the drawee. . . .As used in this instruction, 'prima facie evidence'
is evidence that on its face is true, but may be overcome by evidence to the
contrary.
666 P.2d at 708.
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burden of proof to the defendant."'°3 The court recognized the possibility
that the jury might believe that the burden had been shifted to the defendant to disprove an element of the crime, and, therefore, the court
reversed the defendant's conviction.' 4
Other lower courts have been concerned with the effect of the production-shifting presumption when the defendant introduces no evidence
in rebuttal. In State v. Truppi,'05 the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault, robbery and kidnapping. He appealed, challenging the court's
jury instructions on intent.' 6 The Connecticut Supreme Court asserted
that the burden of producing "some credible evidence" was low, but
pointed out the problem arising from the fact that the defendant had not
taken the stand, offered any witnesses, or suggested any theory of defense
during cross-examination or at any other time. "Thus, unless the state
introduced credible evidence which rebutted the presumed intent, the jury
could have concluded that it must find against the defendant on the issue
of intent even though the state had not otherwise proven intent beyond
a reasonable doubt."' 0 7 Such a conclusion would have violated the defendant's due process rights.' 8
Even when courts are aware of the problems inherent in presumptions
that shift the burden of production onto the defendant, they need not
always reverse the convictions obtained with the aid of such presumptive
instructions. The applicability of harmless error analysis to such instructions will be discussed in Part III, infra.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 711 (emphasis added).
Id.The court found the instruction to be clearly erroneous. Id.
182 Conn. 449, 438 A.2d 712 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
The jury instructions provided:
Now,inthe usual case, the State of Connecticut does not have to offer evidence
to prove that
a man charged with a crime actually had a guilty intent or guilty
knowledge. That is because a man is presumed tohave intended to do the acts
which he did do. Accordingly, until some credible evidence comes into the
case tending to prove that, because in the light of the circumstances as he
honestly and in good faith believe [sic] them to be, the act which he did would
appear to be lawful or because the act was an accident, the State may safely
rely upon the presumption that the accused intended to commit the acts which
he did commit.Until such evidence appears in the case, the jury must presume
that the accused intended to commit such acts as the jury may find that he did
commit. ...
438 A.2d at715.
107. Id.at 717.
108. The same concerns troubled the Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Johnson, 100
Wash.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145, 152 (1983) ("When the defendant presents no evidence to rebut the
presumption, the jury is required to find an element of the crime, effectively removing that issue
from the jury's consideration. In addition, the State is relieved of its burden of proving the element
in question beyond a reasonable doubt. Both of these consequences violate the defendant's constitutional rights .. ").See also People v. Roder, 33 Cal.3d 491, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302,
1308-09 (1983).
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D. Permissive Inferences
Permissive inferences are not technically presumptions at all, since
they do not compel acceptance of the "ultimate fact" upon proof of a
"basic fact"; instead, proof of the "basic fact" merely raises a question
as to whether the "ultimate fact" exists: the jury is free to accept or reject
the existence of the "ultimate fact."" Nevertheless, because permissive
inferences share many of the problems that afflict "true" presumptions,
it is appropriate to analyze them in light of the Winship principle, and
subsequent judicial treatment.
In Allen, the United States Supreme Court discounted the possibility
of tension between the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for all elements of a crime, and the use of permissive inferences:
Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to
credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof,
it affects the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard
only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier
could make the connection permitted by the inference. '
The Court explicitly stated that as long as the connection between the
"basic fact" and the "ultimate fact" was rationally related as applied to
the facts of that case, the permissive inference was likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. "'
The requirement of a "rational relationship" is a recurring theme in
the Court's earlier decisions concerning presumptions and permissive
inferences. Although suggested even earlier," 2 it was presented by the
United States Supreme Court as the "controlling" method of review in
Tot v. United States."3 Tot involved a federal statute which provided that
a person found in possession of a firearm who had previously been convicted of a violent crime was presumed to have received the weapon
through interstate commerce (in violation of the statute). The Court held
the statute unconstitutional, stating that "a statutory presumption cannot
be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of
the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience." " Although the Court in Allen referred to the pre109. Note, supra note 2, at 519.
110. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
Ill. Id.
112. See Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), McFarland
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916), and Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178
(1925). These cases all involved statutory presumptions.
113. 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
114. Id. at 467-68. The Tot Court expressly rejected the "comparative convenience" test, which
would allow a presumption to be applied against a defendant whenever the defendant had greater

Winter 1987]

USE OF PRESUMPTIONS IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

sumption invalidated in Tot as "mandatory" (shifting the burden of production)," 5 the precise nature of the presumption is far from clear." 6 The
same lack of clarity is apparent in the Supreme Court's next consideration
of a deductive device it clearly labelled an "inference," but which may
have had production-shifting effect."' In United States v. Gainey, the
challenged statute provided that proof of a person's presence at an illegal
still "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" for the
offense of carrying on the business of an illegal still, "unless the defendant
explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury.""' 8 Although the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed Gainey's conviction under
the statute on the grounds of a lack of rational connection between the
basic and presumed facts," 9 the Supreme Court found the requisite rational connection present. 2o The Court, therefore, reversed the judgment
121
of the court of appeals and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
Such a rational relationship was not, however, evident to the Supreme
Court in United States v. Romano, 122 which dealt with another statutory
presumption enacted to aid the government in prosecuting liquor cases.
In Romano, presence at an illegal still "authorized" the narrow finding
of "possession, custody and .. .control" of that still. 123 A unanimous
Court distinguished the rationality of the presumption at issue from the
broader one presented in Gainey:
Presence at an operating still is sufficient evidence to prove the charge
of 'carrying on' because anyone present at the site is very probably
connected with the illegal enterprise. .

.

.But presence tells us noth-

ing about what the defendant's specific function was and carries no
legitimate, rational or reasonable inference that he was engaged in
one of the specialized functions connected with possession, rather
familiarity with the facts: "Nor can the fact that the defendant has the better means of information,
standing alone, justify the creation of such a presumption." Id. at 469. In so doing, the Court
invalidated a traditional justification for the use of presumptions.
The Tot Court also rejected a "greater includes the lesser" rationale for the use of presumptions.
"The government had argued that Congress' greaterpower to enact a statute to prohibit the possession
of all firearms by persons convicted of violent crimes, necessarily included the lesser power to create
the presumption in question." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 812 (2d ed. 1972) (emphasis in original).
115. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157, n. 16.
116. The Court's language in Tot would allow one to conclude either that the presumption shifted
the burden of production, or that it constituted merely a permissive inference. Furthermore, since
the opinion does not mention the instructions given to the jury, which "are a crucial indicator of
how a deductive device operates," determining the nature of the presumption is even more difficult.
Schmolesky, supra note 24, at 277.
117. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
118. Id. at 64 n. 2.
119. Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
120. 380 U.S. at 67-68.
121. Id. at 71.
122. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
123. Id. at 140.
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than in one of the supply, delivery or operational activities having
nothing to do with possession. .

.

.[A]bsent some showing of the

defendant's function at the still, its connection with possession is too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt-'the inference of
the one from proof of the other is arbitrary .... ,124
The Court explicitly invalidated the presumption on the grounds of a lack
of rational relationship between the basic fact and the presumed fact; it
pointed out that if the question had been, instead, the sufficiency of the
evidence presented, Romano's conviction would have been sustained.' 25
Four years later, the Supreme Court reiterated the rational relationship
test with greater precision in Leary v. United States. 126 Dr. Timothy Leary
had been convicted under a federal statute that included a presumption
providing that possession of marijuana was sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction of transporting and concealing the drug with knowledge of its
illegal importation unless the defendant explained his possession to the
jury's satisfaction. Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, found
the presumption constitutionally unsound because of the lack of a rational
connection between possession and defendant's knowledge of unlawful
importation:
The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is ...that a criminal

statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary',
and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.' 27
The Court went beyond its earlier requirement that the proved fact
must rationally tend to prove the presumed fact.' 2 8 In Leary, the Court
clearly required a link between
the proved and presumed facts that was
"more likely than not."' 29 Furthermore, the Court continued to test the
rationality of the presumption on its face; it did not question whether Dr.
Leary might have, in fact, known that the marijuana he was carrying was
imported. Rather, the Court consulted books, studies and government
reports demonstrating the likelihood that a significant percentage of domestically consumed marijuana was grown in the United States. The
Court relied on these materials in determining that the presumption was
124. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
125. Id.at 139.
126. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
127. Id.at 36.
128. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68.
129. Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. Since the Court found that the statutory presumption did not meet
the "more likely than not" standard, it expressly did not reach the question of whether the presumption
would satisfy the still more stringent criminal "reasonable doubt" standard. The question of the
applicability of the latter standard is still in doubt. See Note, supra note 8, at 1149.
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invalid because a majority of marijuana users were probably unaware of
the drug's origin. 3 '
The following term, the Court repeated its Leary analysis of extensive
materials outside the record in reviewing a presumption very similar to
the one invalidated in Leary, but dealing with possession of heroin and
cocaine. 'Once again, knowledge of the illegal importation of the drugs
was statutorily permitted to be presumed from possession. The Court
upheld the validity of the presumption as it related to Turner's possession2
of heroin, because it found that no heroin was made in the United States. 13
It invalidated the presumption as it related to cocaine, however, because
that large quantities of cocaine were produced in the
the Court found
33
United States. 1
The Court reviewed a common-law presumption in Barnes v. United
States,'34 the last major decision by the Supreme Court involving a presumptive device before Allen and Sandstrom. The Barnes presumption
allowed the jury to find knowledge that property was stolen from proof
of the defendant's unexplained possession of the property. The Court
consistently referred to the presumption as an inference, perhaps because35
the jury was told that it was "never required to make this inference."
Despite the fact that the Court's previous opinions had analyzed only
statutory presumptions, the Court held that the rational relationship test
was equally applicable to common law presumptions and inferences 36
device in question satisfied even the reasonable
and concluded that
37 the
doubt standard.
130. Leary, 395 U.S. at 52.
131. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
132. Id. at 415-16. The Court concluded:
[Tihe overwhelming evidence is that the heroin consumed in the United States
is illegally imported .... Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard
...or by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard normally applicable in
criminal cases, [the statutory presumption] is valid insofar as it permits a jury
to infer that heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug.
Id.
133. Id. at 418-19. The Court's willingness to rely on materials not introduced at trial to justify
the validity of the presumption disturbed at least two members of the Court. Justice Black dissented,
with the support of Justice Douglas, and pointed out that "petitioner was never given an opportunity
to confront before the jury the many expert witnesses now arrayed against him in the footnotes of
the Court's opinion. Nor does it apparently matter to the Court that the fact-finding role it undertakes
today is constitutionally vested not in this Court but in the jury.'" Id. at 433.
134. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
135. Id. at 840 n. 3.
136. The Court pointed out, however, that common law deductive devices presented fewer constitutional problems since they were invoked "only in the discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 845
n. 8.
137. Id. at 846. The Court stated that if the inference "satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard
(that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the
inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly
accords with due process." Id. at 843.
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In all of the pre-Allen decisions analyzing permissive inferences, the
Court applied a rational relationship test. That test, however, was a facial
test: the Court analyzed whether the presumption was rational on its face,
in light of common experience. The Leary case makes it clear that the
Court did not analyze the rationality of the presumption as applied to the
facts of the particular case before it. Although the Court implicitly acknowledged that Mr. Leary might well have known that the marijuana
he was carrying was imported, the rationality of the presumption in
general was dispositive. In Allen, however, the Court developed a new
rational relationship test; it determined the rationality of the relationship
of the presumption to the actual facts of the Allen case. 138
As discussed above, the Court in Allen reaffirmed the validity of the
rational relationship test as applied to permissive inferences. 139 The Court
explicitly rejected application of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard,
announcing that the Leary more-likely-than-not standard was the appropriate measure of the rational relationship test: "As long as it is clear that
the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt,
it need only satisfy the test described in Leary."'" Although the Allen
Court emphasized that the "basic" fact had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it allowed the prosecution to rely on all of the evidence
in the record in meeting this standard.' 4 Since the Court found that the
challenged permissive presumption satisfied the Leary test, it upheld the
constitutionality of the presumption. "'
The Allen Court characterized permissive inferences as allowing, but
not requiring the trier of fact to infer the "ultimate" fact from proof of
the "basic" fact, and as placing "no burden of any kind on the defendant."' 4 3 Despite this assertion, however, permissive inferences are
not free from many of the problems that afflict presumptions that shift
the burden of persuasion or production onto the defendant. In Barnes,
the Court recognized the actual coercive impact of even permissive inferences. " Justice Black had previously pointed out the potential danger
to a defendant's fifth amendment right to remain silent posed by permissive inferences. 45
'
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that a permissive inference may
138. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
139. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
140. Allen, 442 U.S. at 167. At least one commentator has characterized the Allen stance on the
reasonable doubt standard as a "retreat." See Note, supra note 8, at 1151.
141. 442 U.S. at 167.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 157.
144. 412 U.S. at 846 n. 1i. The Court acknowledged that even if the government proved only
the basic fact of possession, the defendant would, in fact, be influenced to explain his possession,
"since ordinarily the Government's evidence will not provide an explanation . . . consistent with
innocence." Id.
145. See Turner, 396 U.S. at 432-33 (Black, J., dissenting), and Gainey, 380 U.S. at 87-88
(Black, J., dissenting).
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endow the "basic" fact with weight it would not otherwise attain: "A
presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which
all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would
give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect."' 46 Normally, one
piece of relevant evidence would merely tend to prove guilt. A permissive
inference, however, may be used to make that evidence sufficient to find
guilt. Indeed, the inference itself will become evidence for the prosecution
in the case.' 47
Finally, a permissive inference, like other presumptions, presents the
jury with an easy solution to its task. In Sandstrom, the Court pointed
out that a presumption eases the jury's burden of examining the evidence
"and there is no reason to believe the jury would have deliberately undertaken the more difficult task."' 48 That the assistance of even a permissive inference simplifies the jury's responsibilities cannot be in doubt:
"when a jury can infer intent to kill upon proof of the ordinary consequences of the defendant's acts, the jury no longer has to consider all of
whether such an intent exists beyond .a reathe evidence in determining
49
sonable doubt. "1'
Lower courts have adopted several different approaches in determining
whetherjury instructions contain merely permissive inferences after Allen.
In part, the lack of consistency of approach must be attributed to the
inherent inconsistencies in the Allen opinion itself. First, the Court required that the fact to be inferred be rationally related to the fact proved. 5 0
In that respect, permissive inferences do not differ from any other presumption. Next, the Court required an "applied analysis": the party
challenging the permissive inference must "demonstrate its invalidity as
applied to him."'' The Court implicitly shifted the burden to the defendant to show why the permissive inference should be ignored by the
jury; if the defendant did not come forward with evidence refuting the
validity of the inference in his case, the jury would, presumably, apply
the inference, with the Court's blessing.' 52
146. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
147. See Schmolesky, supra note 24, at 302 ("since the burden of production never shifts with
a permissive inference, the jury will hear the instruction no matter how much evidence the defense
introduces to demonstrate that there is no basis for finding the presumed fact. The supposedly
innocuous permissive inference can be more onerous than a mandatory presumption.").
148. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 526 n. 13.
149. Note, supra note 50, at 376 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, "a presumption which
would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a
conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 275 (1952). This concern prompted the Oregon Supreme Court to declare that "[i]nferences
when used against the defendant should be left to argument without any instruction." State v. Rainey,
298 Or. 459, -, 693 P.2d 635, 640 (1985).
150. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157. This is, presumably, a facial analysis.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 162. This second analysis could be seen as requiring the court to find a second rational
relationship between the basic facts and the presumed fact. Alternatively, the four Justices who
dissented may be correct in stating that the Court is simply applying an "unarticulated harmless
error standard" to find the defendants "guilty as charged." Id. at 177 (Powell, J., dissenting).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Thus, it is not clear precisely what Allen was directing the lower courts
to do. In Lannon v. Hogan, 5' 3 the First Circuit Court of Appeals scrutinized
the words actually spoken to the jury, to uphold the instruction because
it contained merely a permissive inference. The court held the instruction
valid and stated: "We do not think that a reasonable juror could have
misinterpreted the instructions. Not only are the particular sentences unambiguously phrased in permissive terms; in addition, they are both
followed by an explicit reminder that the jury 'may' draw the inferences
' The same
but is 'not required' to do so." 154
approach was taken by the
5
court in Nelson v. Solem." ' This approach assumes that the "rational
relationship" requirement has been met, and ignores the Allen Court's
admonition to look at the entire record. Rather, the challenge to jury
instructions is evaluated entirely on the basis of the challenged jury instructions themselves.
A second approach used by some of the lower courts is to examine the
challenged jury instructions within the context of all the instructions given
to the jury. 156 In Brayboy v. Scully, 57
' language identical to that invalidated
in Sandstrom was used three times. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found no error because on two of those occasions, "curative" language
immediately followed.I5 8 Even on the third occasion, the jury was told
that criminal intent was not to be "presumed," from the defendant's
proven acts, but rather that they could infer and find such intent from
"all the circumstances" and "surrounding facts" in light of the jury's
"own experience and understanding of how people operate." "' The court
concluded that these directions transformed the instructions from encompassing conclusive or burden-shifting presumptions into permissive inferences. ' Similarly, in State v. Cosgrove, 161the Connecticut Supreme
153. 719 F.2d 518 (lst Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1606 (1984).
154. Id. at 521. The instructions provided that "you may infer, that is, conclude, that a person
ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of any act which is knowingly done ...
You are not required to come to that conclusion, but you may do so." Id.
155. 640 F.2d 133, 135 (8th Cir. 1981) ("After reviewing the words actually spoken to the jury
and the way a reasonable juror could have interpreted this instruction, we hold that the instruction
constituted only a permissive inference."). See also United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 373 (9th
Cir. 1984).
156. A majority of the Supreme Court recently affirmed the correctness of this method of analysis
in Francis v. Franklin. Emphasizing that the analysis is "straightforward," 105 S.Ct. at 1971, the
Court first determined the nature of the presumption described in the challenged jury instruction,
and then considered the "potentially offending words" within the context of all of the instructions
to the jury. Id. Although the second prong of this analysis is, arguably, a harmless error analysis,
see Part III,
infra, it is perceived by a majority of the Supreme Court as distinct from the harmless
error inquiry. 105 S.Ct. at 1977.
157. 695 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1055 (1983).
158. Id. at 66.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 186 Conn. 476, 442 A.2d 1320 (1982).
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Court relied on the presence of "qualifying instructions" to support its
finding that only a permissive inference was conveyed by the challenged
jury instructions.16 2
A third category of lower court cases examine the language of the jury
instructions themselves, and also look for a rational relationship between
the "basic" fact and the fact to be inferred. In State v. Spoon,' 63 the
Supreme Court of Arizona examined a jury instruction which provided
"[y]ou may determine that the defendant intended to do the act if he did
it voluntarily. 64 The court first decided that the use of the word "may"
established the "permissive character of the instruction. "165 The court
then upheld the instruction, finding that there was a rational relationship
between an individual's voluntary action and his intent to act." 66
The lower courts' analyses of instructions as permissive inferences
reflect the least precision of judicial analysis of presumptions. This may
be due, in part, to the "unarticulated harmless error analysis" that pervades the Allen opinion. A reading of many of the lower court opinions
suggests that what the courts are actually doing is applying harmless error
analysis directly instead of first determining whether error in the form of
a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption is present at all. As discussed
in Part III, infra, the validity of this approach is dubious, for while it
provides appellate courts with a short cut in its inquiry into presumptive
intent jury instructions, constitutional safeguards may be disregarded in
the process.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO
PRESUMPTIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. The Harmless ErrorDoctrine
Until the mid-1960s it had been assumed that automatic reversal was
required whenever a constitutional right was violated. The United States
Supreme Court laid this assumption to rest in Chapman v. California,'67
when it held that some constitutional errors could be considered harmless
162. Id. at -,
442 A.2d at 1323. See also State v. Dusablon, 453 A.2d 79 (Vt. 1982), and
Spurlock v. Risley, 520 F.Supp. 135 (D. Mont. 1981). After Francis v. Franklin, however, qualification of the offending instructions may not be sufficient. The Court explicitly stated that the
challenged jury instructions must be explained in subsequent instructions. 105 S.Ct. at 1976 n. 8.
("Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity." Id. at 1975.).
163. 137 Ariz. 105, 669 P.2d 83 (1983).
164. Id. at
, 669 P.2d at 87.
165. Id. at
, 669 P.2d at 88.
166. Id. The court provided no reason for its conclusion that the inferred fact was rationally
related to the proven fact. See also Hall v. State, 661 S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Tex.Ct.App. 1983)
(Teague, J., concurring).
167. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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if the beneficiary of the error proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 168 As
several commentators pointed out, however, the Chapman rule amounted
to an almost automatic reversal rule, since courts could seldom reasonably
discount the possibility that an error prejudicially influenced a conviction. "'
The Court retreated somewhat from its uncompromising position in
Harrington v. California,'70 decided just two years after Chapman. In
Harrington, the defendant had been convicted of felony murder. At trial,
the confessions of two non-testifying co-defendants had been erroneously
admitted. The Court concluded that the confessions were merely cumulative evidence against the defendant since the defendant's guilt could be
established by his presence at the scene of the crime. Because the Court
found the untainted evidence of his presence to be "overwhelming," it
concluded that the error was harmless. 171
As one commentator has noted, even if Harringtondoes not represent
a departure from the Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
rule," it is "an important indication that in some situations the Court is
willing to resolve the harmless error question by looking at other evidence
of guilt. "'7 2 This willingness to look at other, untainted, evidence becomes
especially significant in the context of presumptive jury instructions.
B. The Supreme Court Background to the Issue of Harmless Error and
Presumptive Jury Instructions
Just last term, in Rose v. Clark, the United States Supreme Court
decided that harmless error analysis could be applied to sustain a conviction for murder.' 73 The trial court had instructed the jury that
All homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of evidence which would rebut the implied presumption. Thus, if the State
has proven beyond a reasonable ... doubt that a killing has occurred,
then it is presumed that the killing was done maliciously. But this
presumption may be rebutted by either direct or circumstantial evidence, or by both, regardless of whether the same 7be
4 offered by the
Defendant, or exists in the evidence of the State. 1
Nevertheless, the Court held that harmless error analysis was appropriate
168. Id. at 24. The Court emphasized, however, that "there are some constitutional rights so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Id. at 23.
169. See, e.g., Note, supra note 50, at 384. See also R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS
ERROR 43-44 (1970).
170. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
171. Id. at 254.
172. Note, supra note 50, at 385.
173. 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 (1986).
174. Id. at 3104.

Winter 1987]

USE OF PRESUMPTIONS

IN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

when "a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7 5 The basis of the Court's
holding was its perception of the purpose of the Winship principle as
ensuring "that only the guilty are criminally punished."' 7 6 By characterizing Winship as focusing on the accuracy of the fact-finding process,
the Court harmonized Winship (and, by extension, Sandstrom) with analysis of the entire record to determine if giving an erroneous jury instruction
was harmless. The Court then remanded to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals to determine77whether the error committed was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.

The Court's decision in Clark apparently resolved the question left
unanswered just two years earlier in Connecticut v. Johnson.' 71 In that
case, the Supreme Court was faced with the question whether a Sandstrom
instruction could ever constitute harmless error.' 79 At that time, the Court
was unable to formulate a decision in which a majority of justices would
join.' 8 ° In his plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun found only 'rare situations" in which a reviewing court could be confident that giving a Sandstrom conclusive presumption instruction did not play any role in a jury's
decision to convict the defendant."'8 The first situation in which this error
might be harmless was when the instruction was given in connection with
an offense for which the defendant was acquitted and the instruction did
not relate to the offense for which he was convicted. Second, if the
defendant conceded the element to be proved by the presumption (in this
case, intent), the error in giving the instruction might also be harmless. 8' 2
Because neither of these exceptional situations were present, Justice
Blackmun concluded that the error in giving the Sandstrom instruction
was not harmless. 83
'
In concluding that Sandstrom presumptions could seldom, if ever, be
harmless error, Justice Blackmun argued that these presumptions allowed
the jury to convict without even examining the evidence presented on
175. Id. at 3107.
176. Id.
177. Id.at 3109.
178. 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
179. The instruction in Connecticut v. Johnson provided that "a person's intention may be inferred
from his conduct and every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary
consequences of his act." Id. at 78.
180. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall and White joined. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, although
he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari. Id. at 88-90. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 90.
181. Id. at 87.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 87-88. The Connecticut Supreme Court had reversed the defendant's conviction, so
its judgment was affirmed. Id. at 88.
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one element of the crime charged.' 84 He applied the Chapman standard:
"If the jury may have failed to consider evidence of intent, a reviewing
court cannot hold that the error did not contribute to the verdict."' 85 In
contrast, Justice Powell, in dissent, emphasized that "[in applying Chapman's test, a court must assess the effect of the error in light of the facts
of each case. "'8 6 He disagreed with the plurality's assertion that a Sandstrom presumption operated independently of the evidence in a case.
Rather, he stated that "[tihe jury must look to the evidence initially to
see if the basic facts have been proved before it can consider whether it
is appropriate to apply the presumption."' 8 7
The dissent castigated the plurality for establishing "an automatic reversal rule whenever a Sandstrom instruction is given, regardless of the
conclusiveness of the evidence of intent."' 88 Furthermore, the dissent
reformulated the harmless-error inquiry:
In determining whether a Sandstrom error was harmless, the inquiry
is not, as the plurality intimates, whether the presumption was unnecessary to the jury's verdict 'in the sense that the evidence was
sufficient for a properly instructed jury to find that respondent acted
with the requisite intent.' Instead, the inquiry is whether the evidence
was so dispositive of intent that a reviewing court can say beyond
a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary
to rely on the presumption.'89

After reviewing the evidence, the dissent concluded that a reviewing
court might well say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found the
presumption unnecessary in determining intent, but, since the Connecticut
Supreme Court had not addressed the issue, the dissent would have remanded the case for consideration of whether the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."9
Due to the lack of a majority, Connecticut v. Johnson did not resolve
the question of the applicability of harmless error analysis to Sandstromtype instructions. The issue remained unresolved in Franklin, as the Court
explicitly deferred to the lower court's determination that the erroneous
instruction was not harmless error."'9 Both the Allen and Sandstrom opin184. Id. Justice Blackmun unsuccessfully propounded the same argument in his dissenting opinion
in Rose v. Clark. 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3115 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In that opinion, Justice Blackmun
was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
185. 460 U.S. at 85-86.
186. Id. at 95 (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)).
187. Id. at 96. In Clark, Justice Powell advanced the same argument in his majority opinion.
106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107-08. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined
in that opinion.
188. 460 U.S. at 97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 97 n. 5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 101-02 (Powell, J., dissenting).
191. 105 S.Ct. at 1977.
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ions, however, offered guidance (although frequently contradictory) on
this question.
Sandstrom has been described as implicitly rejecting harmless error
analysis.' 92 This characterization of the opinion derives from the fact that
"the pivotal concept of Sandstrom is that the possibility that the jury
reached its decision in an impermissible manner requires reversal even
though the jury may also have reached the same result in a constitutionally
acceptable fashion."' 93 The Court explicitly refused to consider the question of whether the error could be harmless, as the Montana Supreme
Court had not considered the issue.' 94 The Court acknowledged that the
lower court could consider the issue on remand, explicitly acknowledging
the possibility of the error's being deemed harmless. "'
As has been suggested, 96 the Allen Court's analysis of permissive
presumptions may have been an unarticulated application of the harmless
error standard. The Court's insistence on determining the constitutionality
of a permissive inference by reviewing the inference as applied to the
facts of the case, suggests a harmless error "overwhelming evidence"
standard like that articulated in Harrington v. California.97 The Allen
Court was careful, however, to limit this type of analysis to permissive
inferences. The Court rejected the "overwhelming evidence" standard of
review as applied to presumptions that shift the burden of production.' 98
Nevertheless, both the Allen and Sandstrom opinions left considerable
doubt as to the applicability of harmless error analysis to presumptive
intent jury instructions. For this reason, it is difficult to reconcile Rose
v. Clark with the Court's earlier opinions analyzing presumptive intent
jury instructions.
C. Application of Rose v. Clark: Does Harmless ErrorAnalysis
Weaken Winship?
In Rose v. Clark, the Supreme Court did not consider whether the jury
instructions given at trial were permissible under the Sandstrom or Allen
standards. Instead, the Court assumed that the instructions were unconstitutional, 9 but found the error to be harmless. °° The majority opinion
reached this result by applying a two-step analysis. First, it established
192. See Note, supra note 2, at 540.
193. Schmolesky, supra note 24, at 272 (emphasis in original). See also supra text accompanying
note 24.
194. 442 U.S. at 527.
195. Id.
196. See supra text accompanying note 151.
197. 395 U.S. at 254.
198. Allen, 442 U.S. at 159-60.
199. 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105 n. 5 (1986).
200. Id. at 3109.
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a rule of near-universal applicability of harmless error analysis.2 o' In doing
so, the Court endowed a verdict obtained at a trial where the defendant
was represented by counsel and was tried by an impartial judge with a
presumption of validity.2" 2 Second, the Court reconciled harmless error
analysis with Winship's mandate of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every element of the charged crime. The Court did so by characterizing
that mandate as designed to ensure that only the guilty are criminally
punished.203 The Court reasoned that "[wihen the verdict of guilty reached
in a case in which Sandstrom error was committed is correct beyond a
reasonable doubt, reversal of the conviction does nothing to promote the
interest that the [Winship] rule serves." 204
Although superficially appealing by virtue of its simplicity, the majority's approach to the applicability of harmless error analysis to presumptive intent jury instructions suffers from several critical flaws. First,
as Justice Stevens pointed out in his separate opinion concurring in the
judgment, harmless error analysis has historically been the exception,
rather than the rule in examining constitutional errors.20 5 Justice Stevens
compared the Clark majority's broad statements about the almost universal applicability of harmless error analysis with the Court's earlier
holding in Chapman v. California: " 'We conclude that there may be
some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal
of the conviction.' ",206 Justice Stevens characterized Chapmanas having
articulated a "rigorous standard for determining whether a presumptively
prejudicial error could, in fact, be deemed harmless,12 7 and disagreed
with the majority's establishment of a rule of presumptive applicability
of harmless error analysis.
Justice Stevens' concern with the majority's characterization of the
harmless error rule as broadly applicable is well-taken. As originally
fashioned, the harmless error rule was a narrow exception to the rule of
automatic reversal for presumptively prejudicial constitutional errors. The
Clark majority effectively stood that rule on its head, and left only a few
exceptions to the new rule of applicability of harmless error analysis to
constitutional errors.20 8 The obvious question after Clark is whether even
201. Id. at 3106. "we have emphasized, however, that while there are some errors to which
Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 3107.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 3110-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
206. Id. at 3110 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)).
207. Id. at 3111 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
208. These exceptions are the introduction of a coerced confession, complete denial of the right
to counsel, and adjudication by a biased judge. Id. at 3106.
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these few last bastions of immunity to harmless error analysis can withstand being subjected to harmless error inquiry in the long run. Furthermore, application of harmless error analysis to constitutional error reflects
an implicit assessment of the lack of importance of that error, and, ultimately, of the constitutional right violated as well. The Clark majority
implicitly characterized the right to counsel and to an impartial adjudicator
as the "primary" constitutional rights at issue in a criminal trial; the many
other constitutional rights implicated in errors subject to harmless error
analysis only "ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments. '"2 By implication, then, the constitutional interest in fair and
correct judgments is less important than other interests that are "basic to
a fair trial." 2 '
The problem with the Clark majority's implicit ranking of constitutional
values by importance is aggravated by the majority's compression into
one of the two constitutional values implicated in presumptive intent jury
instructions. As discussed earlier,2 ' these values are the due process right
to a reliable and accurate fact-finding process, and the sixth amendment
right to have a jury find that the prosecution had proved every element
of the charged crime. The Clark Court characterized Winship and Sandstrom as concerned only with the reliability of the fact-finding process.2" 2
As Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion accurately pointed out, however, the Clark majority focused entirely on the due process right and
disregarded the sixth amendment right."1 3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun equated the sixth amendment right to have a jury determine that the prosecution had met its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged
crime with the class of constitutional errors recognized by the majority
as rendering a trial fundamentally unfair.2" 4 The dissent argued that the
latter class of errors, such as denial of the right to counsel and trial before
a biased judge, "play central roles in the basic trial process,"2"5 and that
the jury is an equally "central entity" under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments.2" 6 The dissent reasoned that the error in the instant case
was "analytically indistinguishable" from the errors the majority had
stated were not amenable to harmless error analysis," 7 because "[t]he
erroneous instruction invites the jury to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to decide for itself whether the State has proved every element
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 3107.
Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)).
See text accompanying note 39, supra.
106 S.Ct. at 3107.
Id. at 3113 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."" 8 The dissent thus rejected
the majority's assertion that a Sandstrom error was not equivalent to a
directed verdict for the State.
Although the Clarkmajority acknowledged that harmless error analysis
would not apply if a court directed a verdict for the prosecution in a
criminal jury trial, 2" 9 it summarily rejected the dissent's contention that
a Sandstrom error was equivalent to a directed verdict for the State. 22 °
The Court stated that " [w]hen a jury is instructed to presume malice from
predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. "22' This reasoning does not, however, resolve the problem of a burden-shifting instruction on intent constituting, in effect, a
directed verdict for the prosecution. Under Winship, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. If
a jury is allowed to presume an element, intent, for example, from proof
of defendant's commission of a killing, the court has effectively directed
a verdict of first degree murder upon a finding by the jury that the
prosecution has proved defendant guilty of second degree murder. 222 The
mere fact that the jury found that the prosecution had proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the facts necessary to convict the defendant of second
degree murder does not legitimize this result.
The problem with informing the jury that it is permitted to presume,
or infer, intent from the defendant's actions, stems directly from the fact
that in many criminal cases, intent is the only issue in dispute. The Clark
majority correctly pointed out that in many of those cases, the facts
developed at trial conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury
could find that the defendant committed the act charged, but did not
intend to cause the injury."' In those cases, as the Court also pointed
'
out, the erroneous instruction is "simply superfluous," 224
and should
probably not have been requested. The real problem with these instructions occurs, however, when the evidence of intent at trial was not over218. Id. at 3115.
219. Id. at 3106.
220. Id. at 3107.
221. Id. at 3107-08. Justice Powell quoted from his own dissenting opinion in Connecticut v.
Johnson, in which he stated " 'Because a presumption does not remove the issue from the jury's
consideration, it is distinguishable from other instructional errors that prevent a jury from considering
an issue.' " Id. at 3107 n. 8 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 95 n. 3 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
222. Indeed, in Clark, the defendant was charged with the first degree murders of two people
who were together in a truck when they were shot to death. According to the dissenting opinion,
the State used the same evidence to prove that Clark killed both people. 106 S.Ct. at 3115 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The jury, however, convicted Clark of first degree murder of one of the victims, and
second degree murder of the other. Id.
223. Id. at 3108.
224. Id.
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whelming, as in the Franklin case, for example,225 and the court instructs
the jury that it may presume or infer intent if it finds that the prosecution
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed
the predicate acts. In these more difficult cases, the Clark majority's
argument notwithstanding, the court may have impermissibly rendered a
directed verdict against the defendant on the issue of intent.226
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the legitimization of the harmless
error inquiry in this context obviates the necessity for a preliminary inquiry
into the nature of the presumption (whether it shifts the burden of persuasion or production, or is merely an inference), and allows the reviewing
court to assume that the instruction was unconstitutional if it is going to
find the error to be harmless anyway. Thus, the reviewing court may
immediately engage in a review of the entire record, looking only for
evidence supporting a defendant's conviction, and then find any error
that may have occurred in instructing the jury to have been harmless.
Justice Stevens pointed out the practical dangers of automatic application
of harmless error analysis in his opinion concurring in the judgment in
Clark: "An automatic application of harmless error review in case after
case, and for error after error, can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the ever present and
always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case. "227
Although it is premature to attempt to speculate about the effect that
the Clark decision will have on the lower courts, a review of the six
reported lower court decisions228 analyzing presumptive intent jury instructions in light of Rose v. Clark is interesting and instructive. In Myrick
v. Maschner,229 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals examined an instruction
that had shifted to the defendant the burden of proving intent.23 ° The
defendant had been convicted of premeditated and felony murder. The
court acknowledged that the instruction contravened due process,' and
225. See text accompanying note 68, supra.
226. The widespread use of general verdict forms makes it impossible to tell, on review, whether
the jury actually found that the prosecution had proved intent, or whether the jury merely presumed
or inferred intent from their finding that the defendant committed the predicate acts.
227. 106 S.Ct. at 3112 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also authorities criticizing the impact of
the Supreme Court's expansive harmless error jurisprudence collected in United States v. Lane, 106
S.Ct. 725, 732-33 nn. 13 and 14 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Dix v. Kemp, 804 F.2d 618 (11th Cir. 1986); Merlo v. Bolden, 801 F2d 252 (6th Cir.
1986); Thomas v. Kemp, 800 E2d 1024 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Myrick v. Maschner, 799
F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1986); Washington v. Scully, 640 ESupp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Guizar v.
Estelle, 640 ESupp. 1146 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
229. 799 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1986).
230. The instruction provided: "There is a presumption that a person intends all the natural and
probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by
the evidence that the contrary is true." Id. at 644-45.
231. Id. at 645.
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then applied harmless error analysis, as instructed in Rose v. Clark.232
The defendant had argued that the evidence as to his intent was not clear,
but the Court of Appeals found his argument unconvincing, in light of
the fact that he was tried as an accessory, whose only requisite intent was
that he had intentionally promoted or assisted in the commission of the
crime.233 After reviewing the record, the court found that the evidence
of defendant's intent was clear beyond a reasonable doubt, and upheld
the conviction, reasoning that the error in instructing the jury had been
harmless.234

In three post-Clark cases, however, the reviewing courts have deter235
mined that Sandstrom errors were not harmless. In Thomas v. Kemp,
the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered an earlier decision holding that a Sandstrom instruction was not harmless error in light of Rose v. Clark.236 The
defendant had argued that the admittedly violent acts he had committed
were insufficient to establish intent because he had been under the influence of drugs when he acted, and was not capable of forming the intent
to do those acts. 237 After reviewing the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the unconstitutional burden-shifting instruction could not be
238
said, beyond a reasonable doubt, not to have affected the jury's verdict.
The court relied on the holding in Sandstrom, and reasoned that "the law
of Sandstrom is now fixed in federal law, and a proper application of that
law to this case prevents the court from denying relief for the constitutional
239
,
error of the state court under the harmless-error standard of Rose v.Clark.
Similarly, in Merlo v. Bolden,24 ° the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether a Sandstrom error was harmless when defendant had
contested the element of intent, in light of Rose v. Clark. The court
acknowledged that its earlier holding that a Sandstrom error could not
be harmless when a defendant challenged the element of intent was no
longer a correct statement of the law after Clark.24 ' After reviewing the
232. "Consequently, the harmless error analysis that we now must undertake requires our viewing
the entire record to determine whether the instruction which theoretically could have altered the
verdict of the jury actually had such effect as a practical reality." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing
Clark, 106 S.Ct. at 3108 n. 11).
233. 799 F.2d at 645-46.
234. Id. at 646. See also Guizar v. Estelle, 640 F.Supp. 1146 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (instruction
containing mandatory presumption on intent harmless error in light of entire record); Washington v.
Scully, 640 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
235. 800 F.2d 1024 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
236. The court's earlier judgment, Thomas v. Kemp, 766 F.2d 452 (11th Cir. 1985), had been
vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Rose
v. Clark, 106 S.Ct. 3325 (1986).
237. 800 F.2d at 1026.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 801 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1986).
241. Id.at 257.
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record, however, the court found that the evidence was "in such a balanced state that we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it was so
dispositive of intent. . . that the jury would have found it unnecesary to
rely on the presumption' created by the erroneous Sandstrom instruction." 242 The court refused, therefore, to find that the error was harmless.243
Although all of the lower court opinions after Clark carefully examined
the evidence in determining whether the errors in jury instructions were
harmless, it is not clear that Clark has instructed the reviewing courts to
ask the correct questions. As Justice Blackmun warned in his dissenting
opinion, "[t]he Court recognized 40 years ago that the question a reviewing court must ask 'is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record,
but whether guilt has been found by a jury according to the procedures
and standards' required by the Constitution. '"2" It remains to be seen
whether the lower courts will find the Supreme Court's guidance in this
area sufficient to enable them to find answers to this question.
CONCLUSION
The tension between the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of a charged crime and the use of presumptions to ease the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal cases has
not been resolved by the Supreme Court's opinions. The Allen Court's
observation that "[i]nferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding ' 2 45 is still true, and unlikely to change

without clearer guidance from the highest Court in the land.
Perhaps the real problem is the Mullaney-Patterson one of definition
of the elements of a crime. If, instead of side-stepping the issue, the
Supreme Court were to provide clear guidance as to what elements of a
crime could not constitutionally be omitted from states' definitions of
their crimes, the constitutionality of even permissive inferences might be
more easily determined, and the need for harmless error review would
be avoided. The judiciary would.be warned against placing undue weight
on certain aspects of the prosecution's case, for fear that presumptive
intent instructions might place criminal convictions in constitutional jeopardy.
An obvious solution to the problem has been found by the many courts
242. Id. (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 97 n. 5 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
243. 801 F.2d at 257. See also Dix v. Kemp, 804 F.2d 618, 621-22 (11 th Cir. 1987) (evidence
of defendant's intent found to be not overwhelming in light of defense of insanity, so Sandstrom
error not harmless).
244. 106 S.Ct. at 3115-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326
U.S. 607, 614 (1946)).
245. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156.
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that disallow instructions that permit the jury to presume or infer intent
from a criminal defendant's actions.246 Indeed, the "overwhelming evidence" harmless error analysis illuminates the very redundancy of presumptive intent jury instructions in some cases. If the evidence presented
on intent is truly "overwhelming," it is surely unnecessary to provide
the jury with the crutch of a presumption on intent. It is only when the
evidence is scanty that such an instruction is necessary for conviction. It
is precisely in this latter situation that the instruction is most troublesome
and most likely to be constitutionally infirm.
The answer emphatically does not lie in formalistic omission or inclusion of words like "presume" or "infer." Rather, the judiciary must be
informed of the dangers inherent in the use of presumptions and permissive inferences, and be provided guidelines for solving these problems.
Until more concrete guidance is forthcoming from the Supreme Court,
the basic tension between the use of presumptive jury instructions and
the Winship principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is likely to
remain.

246. See State v. Rainey, 298 Or. 459, __, 693 P.2d 635, 640 (1985) ("Inferences when used
against the defendant should be left to argument without any instruction."); United States v. Winter,
663 F.2d 1120, 1144 (lst Cir. 1981) ("we hold that this sort of instruction should not be used.").

